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Presidential Foreign Policy: An
Opportunity for International
Law Education
Laurie R. Blank *
This essay explores an interesting opportunity for the
president in the foreign policy arena: the role of educator
on international law and its central principles, for both
the president and his surrogates in the executive branch.
In the current environment in which the United States is
engaged in extensive, wide-ranging, and challenging
military operations against diverse foes, this educational
role has significant potential in the arena of the law of
armed conflict specifically. With reference to historical
and current examples of how presidents have used—or
not
used—international
law
as
an
effective
communication medium, this essay highlights how the
president can communicate effective messages with
regard to international law, and the law of armed conflict
in particular, to the public through a much more focused
and proactive view of the president as an educator in this
area.
On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait, its
tiny neighbor to the southeast. Under the leadership of President
George H.W. Bush, the United States marshaled a multinational
coalition, secured UN authorization for the use of force, and launched
military operations to push Iraqi forces out of Kuwait and liberate
Kuwait. 1 On the eve of Operation Desert Storm, the military
operations launched on January 16, 1991, President Bush spoke to the
nation, explaining the background to and purpose of Operation Desert
Storm. 2 In so doing, he set forth a comprehensive and effective
description of jus ad bellum and the U.S. justification for using force
against Iraq in that instance.
*
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1.

DEP’T OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT: AN
INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS, 1-1 (1991), available at http://www.
dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/PersianGulfWar/305.pdf.

2.

President George H.W. Bush, Speech Announcing U.S. Attack on Iraq,
1991 (Jan. 16, 1991) [hereinafter President Bush Speech], available at
http://infousa.state.gov/government/overview/bush_iraq.html.
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Jus ad bellum is the Latin term for the law governing the resort to
force, that is, when a state may use force within the constraints of the
UN Charter framework and traditional legal principles. 3 The UN
Charter prohibits the use of force by one state against another in
Article 2(4): “All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 4 International
law provides for three exceptions to this prohibition on the use of
force: consent, UN Security Council authorization for a multinational
operation, and self-defense. The last of these exceptions formed the
foundation for US action in the Persian Gulf in 1991.
Under Article 51 and the historical right of self-defense, a state
can use force in individual or collective self-defense in response to an
armed attack as long as the force used is necessary and proportionate
to the goal of repelling the attack or ending the grievance. 5 Thus, the
law focuses on whether the defensive act is appropriate in relation to
the ends sought. The requirement of proportionality in jus ad bellum
measures the extent of the use of force against the overall military
goals, such as fending off an attack or subordinating the enemy. The
requirement of necessity addresses whether there are adequate nonforceful options to deter or defeat the attack. To this end, “acts done
in self-defense must not exceed in manner or aim the necessity
provoking them.” 6
In his January 16th speech, President Bush addressed each of
these components of jus ad bellum in turn, essentially providing the
American people with a primer for the international law governing the
use of force. First, President Bush identified the armed attack—the
trigger for any use of force in self-defense: “the dictator of Iraq
invaded a small and helpless neighbor. Kuwait . . . was crushed; its

3.

The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force with two
exceptions: the right to self-defense and the multilateral use of force
authorized by the Security Council under Article 42. U.N. Charter art.
2, para. 4 (prohibiting the use of force); id. art. 51 (recognizing the
inherent right of self-defense); id. art. 42 (providing for the
authorization of multilateral use of force).

4.

Id. art. 2, para. 4.

5.

See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 246 (July 8); Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
102–04 (June 27); Jus ad Bellum, Partial Award, Ethiopia v. Eritrea, at
2–7 (Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Comm’n, 2005), http://www.pca-cpa.org/
upload/files/FINAL%20ET%20JAB.pdf.

6.

Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 132 (1986).
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people, brutalized.” 7 Second, President Bush introduced the collective
action to defend Kuwait against that armed attack: “the 28 countries
with forces in the Gulf area hav[ing] exhausted all reasonable efforts
to reach a peaceful resolution—have no choice but to drive Saddam
from Kuwait by force.” 8 Third, President Bush showed that the
United States was in compliance with the principle of necessity:
“[s]anctions were tried for well over 5 months, and we and our allies
concluded that sanctions alone would not force Saddam from
Kuwait,” and “[r]egrettably, we now believe that only force will make
him leave.” 9 Finally, President Bush also showed the United States
was complying with the principle of proportionality: “[o]ur goal is not
the conquest of Iraq. It is the liberation of Kuwait,” and “[o]ur
objectives are clear: Saddam Hussein’s forces will leave Kuwait. The
legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place,
and Kuwait will once again be free.” 10 President Bush may not have
used the legal term jus ad bellum or referenced specific provisions of
the UN Charter, but he nonetheless offered a remarkably clear
statement of the legal parameters for U.S. action and how the U.S.
operation fit squarely within international legal frameworks.
President Bush’s speech highlights an interesting opportunity for
the President in the foreign policy arena: the role of educator on
international law and its central principles. President Woodrow
Wilson and President Franklin Roosevelt also engaged in this type of
dialogue with presentations to the American public, most notably
with respect to the League of Nations and the US entrance into
World War II, respectively. 11 In the post-9/11 world, both President
George W. Bush and President Obama have had countless
opportunities to engage in such an educational role with regard to
international law. And yet few of those opportunities have been
seized, at least in as direct and effective a way as the example
described above from Operation Desert Storm.

7.

President Bush Speech, supra note 2.

8.

Id.

9.

Id.

10.

Id.

11.

See President Woodrow Wilson, Final Addresses in Support of the
League of Nations (Sept. 25, 1919), available at https://www.mt
holyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ww40.htm (attempting to “remove the
impressions” and “check the falsehoods” surrounding the League of
Nations); President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address to Congress
Requesting a Declaration of War (Dec. 8, 1941), available at http://
millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3324 (addressing the nation
regarding the state of affairs after the Japanese attacks in Hawaii and
throughout the Pacific).
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Soon after the 9/11 attacks made al-Qaeda a household word
throughout the United States and much of the world, the Bush
Administration characterized US efforts to defeat al-Qaeda and
associated terrorist groups as a “war on terror.” 12 One response to the
attacks could have been to reinforce the United States’ commitment
to the rule of law, no matter who its foe or how they fought. In
contrast, however, for the first several years, the rhetoric of the war
on terror facilitated and encouraged the growth of authority without
the corresponding spread of obligation in many cases. One of the
unfortunate consequences of the use of the rhetoric of a “war on
terror” was a growing sense that “war” can displace law and rights.
As Harold Hongju Koh (Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of
State from 2009–2013) wrote soon after the 9/11 attacks: “In the days
since, I have been struck by how many Americans—and how many
lawyers—seem to have concluded that, somehow, the destruction of
four planes and three buildings has taken us back to a state of nature
in which there are no laws or rules.” 13 Similarly, the Bush
Administration often promoted the more explicit notion that some
people simply fall outside the bounds of the law. Thus, the US
government took the approach that persons detained in the course of
operations against al-Qaeda are neither combatants nor civilians—
terms with specific protective connotations under the law of armed
conflict—but rather, that they fell outside the law’s existing
parameters. Indeed, the highly problematic statement that the
Geneva Conventions did not apply to members of al-Qaeda, and
sometimes even the Taliban, was a common refrain in the early years
of the war on terror. 14 In effect, the Bush Administration did not
simply avoid an active educational role with regard to international
law; rather, in many cases, it went in the other direction entirely and
eschewed international law principles in its public pronouncements,
leaving the public in the dark about guiding norms and principles
applicable to current events.
12.

See President George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress
(Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-20/us/gen.
bush.transcript_1_joint-session-national-anthem-citizens?_s=PM:US.

13.

Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 23
(2002). Koh continues: “In fact, over the years, we have developed an
elaborate system of domestic and international laws, institutions,
regimes, and decision-making procedures precisely so that they will be
consulted and obeyed, not ignored, at a time like this.” Id.

14.

See, e.g., Memorandum from President George W. Bush on Humane
Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available
at http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/foia/pdf/detainee/Humane%20Tre
atment%20of%20al%20Qaeda%20and%20Taliban%20Detainees.pdf
(determining that various articles of the Third Geneva Convention do
not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees).

104

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
Presidential Foreign Policy

The Obama Administration has seemed outwardly to take a
wholly opposite tack, especially in the past few years. At the
beginning of his first term, President Obama regularly referred—at
least in broad strokes—to international principles when announcing
efforts to close the Guantanamo Bay detention center or to eliminate
all coercive forms of interrogation, for example. 15 The exponential
increase in the use of drone strikes, however, produced the most
notable and comprehensive engagement with international law of
President Obama’s first term. Beginning with then-Legal Advisor
Koh’s speech in March 2010 and culminating in a series of speeches
by senior Obama Administration officials throughout 2011 and 2012,
the President appeared to offer extensive explanation of the
international legal principles governing the use of drone strikes
against al-Qaeda operatives in various locations around the globe. At
first, the Administration announced that the United States was using
targeted strikes because it “is engaged in an armed conflict or [is
acting] in legitimate self-defense.” 16 Subsequent addresses by
Department of Defense General Counsel Jeh Johnson, 17 Attorney
General Eric Holder, 18 and senior counterterrorism advisor John O.
Brennan 19 continued this same theme of a combination of law of war
and jus ad bellum paradigms to justify and explain the parameters for
the use of targeted strikes. On first glance, these speeches seem to
accomplish precisely the same purpose and effect as the 1991 speech
by President Bush noted above: clear statements of international law
and reasons for US action. However, the United States’ insistence on
referring to both legal paradigms as justification for individual attacks
and the broader program of targeted strikes raises significant concerns
15.

See Mark Tran, Obama Signs Order to Close Guantanamo Bay, THE
GUARDIAN (UK), Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world
/2009/jan/22/hillary-clinton-diplomatic-foreign-policy.

16.

Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, US Dep’t of State, Keynote Address
at the Annual Meeting of the American Soc’y of Int’l Law: The Obama
Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.

17.

Jeh Johnson, Dep’t of Defense General Counsel, National Security Law,
Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration (Feb. 22, 2012),
available at http://www.cfr.org/national-security-and-defense/jeh-john
sons-speech-national-security-law-lawyers-lawyering-obamaadministration/p27448.

18.

Eric Holder, Attorney General, Remarks Regarding Targeted Killing at
Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and-the-law/holders-speech-targetedkilling-march-2012/p27562.

19.

John O. Brennan, White House Counter Terrorism Adviser, Speech on
US Drone Strikes Targeted at al-Qaida at the Woodrow Wilson Center
(Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.npr.org/2012/05/01/1517
78804/john-brennan-delivers-speech-on-drone-ethics.
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for the use of international law and the protection of individuals by
blurring the lines between the key parameters of the two paradigms. 20
In reality, therefore, the series of speeches ultimately undermined the
educational possibilities in the service of a specific policy goal.
Notwithstanding political pressures and the broader needs of
policy, it is possible to conceive of an effective educational role for the
President and his surrogates in the executive branch with regard to
international law. Indeed, in the current environment in which the
United States is engaged in extensive, wide-ranging, and challenging
military operations against diverse foes, this educational role has
significant potential in the arena of the law of armed conflict.
President George W. Bush’s approach suggested a disregard for law
and morality in the conduct of military operations—a message that
was loudly and clearly communicated to the public, whether by word
or by deed. President Obama’s approach suggests a much greater
comfort level with international law and willingness to reference and
rely on international legal principles for policy purposes, but evinces
an unfortunate manipulation of the law that can have problematic
effects over time. In an ideal world, the President can communicate
three effective messages with regard to international law, particularly
the law of armed conflict, to the public through a much more focused
and proactive view of the President as an educator in this area.
First, the law of armed conflict has at its core principles of honor,
morality, and dignity that look much like the principles underlying
our own constitutional rights and protections in the United States.
Humane treatment and respect for the rule of law are common
threads in domestic law and international law and thus can form the
foundation for a productive conversation about why compliance with
the law of armed conflict is a positive feature of rather than a
negative imposition on US operations.
Second, international law, and specifically the law of armed
conflict, facilitates US effectiveness by creating a framework within
which the United States can engage with allies and foes alike. The law
forms a constraint, but also creates opportunity, and this notion of
law as a medium for increased possibility and effectiveness is rarely
presented to the public at large. Rather, international law is too often
portrayed as an external constraint that interferes in the
government’s ability to accomplish its goals. Here, the President can
play a significant role in educating the American public about the
value of international law (whether the law of armed conflict or other
areas of international law) in facilitating relations between states and

20.

See generally Laurie R. Blank, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of
Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, 38 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1655 (2012).
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protecting U.S. service members and civilians in a dangerous and
complex world environment.
Finally, the United States has been at the heart of nearly all
major developments in international law and the law of armed conflict
over the past century and more. The President should seize the
opportunity to educate the American public regarding the role the
United States has historically played in the development of the law
and why the United States has promoted such developments. An
obvious example is the International Criminal Court. Notwithstanding
the United States’ reluctance to join the Rome Statute, 21 it would be
useful for the American public to understand the United States’ view
of the value of international criminal justice and its contribution to
the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Recognizing
the role the United States has played can only help the American
public develop a more nuanced understanding of how and why the
United States engages on a variety of levels in the international legal
arena.
These three messages require a more sophisticated conversation
about international law, about the United States’ place in the
international community, and about the complexities of constraint
and opportunity inherent in international law. Taking on this
educational role may thus be more complicated, especially with regard
to the relationship between law and policy, but offers long-term
benefits for both the government and the public that should not be
overlooked.

21.

Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, The United States and the
International Criminal Court 5 (Harvard Uni., Working Paper T-00-02),
available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20
Papers/ICC.pdf.

107

